

CMC \ FAITSMAI

CRISIS PATTERNS

K expected a

major humiliation

loss of China:

US FA!

K expected a surprising

Crises are dangerous--for all.

Not only in Cuba II, but in Indochina 1954, Quemoy 55, Quemoy 58: we were closer to major violence than public realized at time, and closer than enemy anticipated.

Why? And why didn't opponent anticipate? (Why hadn't we anticipated? Often: because opponent's action seemed improbable because our own response seemed "obvious" to us. Why hadn't it to opponent?)

Why is it surprising to opponent that it is dangerous to produce a humiliating surprise for us? Because they overestimate ability to produce a fait accompli; underestimate our ability to move fast and violently when motivated to do so by the conditions they have created? As if speed of victim's response, and decisiveness were independent of the nature of the "problem" presented and the way it arose; aggressor may have extrapolated from victim's behavior in situations that threatened or reduced his national security but did not in fact create the precise sorts of pressures that the aggressor's action does (no political pressure, no deception, no public commitment. Aggressor has wrong theory.

Is key to unexpected behavior, the linkage of national and personal crisis? Ike's acceptance of responsibility for U-2?

((If Summit were to be sunk by K anyway: suppose Ike had disclaimed responsibility for U-2, as K had proposed?))

If faits accompli were tried only when they were almost sure to work, they would not be so productive of crisis, so dangerous; a good theory of the fait accompli ^{in aggressor's hands} might produce more of them, but avoid the most dangerous ones. It would also alert victim, reduce opportunities for successful ones.

Cuba and Suez: Suez was Cuba if we had waited, announced; then acted.

Reasons why a fait accompli is or appears difficult.
Reasons why a fait accompli is or appears possible or even easy.

One reason it is possible to achieve surprise of heads of state is that there are potent means of influencing their expectations, "channels" of information and communication, that are little-known to the public; moreover, heads of state do not seem generally aware of the extent to which indications received through these channels can be manipulated, nor do they anticipate attempts to manipulate them for deception (since, in the case of communication channels, they regard them as essential to both parties for the conveyance of "truth"--amidst lies and ambiguities addressed to the ~~mx~~ multiple audiences listening in on other channels; and in the case of intelligence channels, they hope and believe that the other party is unaware of the existence of the "channel": the method of observation, or the observed data, or its perceived significance.)

Thus, if one is willing to distort the "messages" sent over these private wires" one can ~~xxxx~~ capture the expectations of the ~~x~~ recipient, who may make little "correction" in the messages received for distortion or intended deception and who may give such information great weight, relative to other evidence (available to the public) in forming his opinions. *(Case of SE before Cuban II.)*

But an unintended consequence of deception through these channels is that it creates a difference in the evidence available (both at the time, and in retrospective analyses) to the heads of state and to their publics, and hence in ~~their~~ what seem to them reasonable expectations (unless it is accompanied by effective deception through public channels--which would first require capturing the attention of the public, which may be counter-indicated, or allaying its attention, which may in some circumstances be almost impossible; there are means of convincing or distracting an interested expert that have almost no effect on the lay public's opinions).

A political problem for these heads of state is thus a direct consequence of this tactic; for they find it hard to explain their evident surprise and unreadiness to their own publics (or even, staffs) who may find the actual moves of the opponent "unsurprising," on the evidence available to them at the time or later. The public is thus prone to find the actual expectations of the leaders as unsupported, unreasonable, and their unreadiness as reckless or inexcusable; their posture is one of incompetence (or even dangerous irresponsibility or treachery, connivance or treachery) and unfitness for office.

These domestic political problems--which on the whole serve no purpose to the opponent, but on the contrary pose risks to him--are thus a consequence (apparently usually unanticipated) of using means of deception that do not include, or are not effective upon, the opponent's public.

(These channels are so private that the public typically does not even imagine the existence of any types of evidence that--unlike the sorts of data available to them--might reasonably provide a basis for the precision and degree of confidence in the expectations on which their leaders evidently acted. Or in other cases, it is the confusion and uncertainty displayed by the leaders that is inexplicable on the basis of public knowledge. *The public is thus led to favor hypotheses of extreme wickedness, intention, even complicity -- to explain "How could they be so wrong?"*

In the case of intelligence channels, it is peculiarly difficult to know the opponent's degree of awareness of the nature of the observation process or his ability to circumvent it upon occasion. There seems to be a tendency--perhaps reflecting wishfulness, given the need to know and the need to justify large expenditures on intelligence, as well as favorable experience--to underestimate the ability of a nation with considerable resources and experience in intelligence matters, to achieve secrecy, to circumvent observation. (A danger, in missile gap period; a fact, in Chinese physical intervention in Korea, Suez, Cuban missile crisis, Berlin wall). Hence, potential for surprise. "Absence of indications" may be taken as highly--and unduly--reassuring, even to the extent of outweighing ominous ~~indicators~~ "evidence" available to the public.

Thus: a surprise not shared by the public, and both unreasonable and inexplicable to the public, is politically the most dangerous sort of surprise for a political leader; and it is precisely the sort of surprise produced by the initiator of a fait accompli, who must above all deceive the opposing head of state and who is then tempted or required to use channels which (having restricted access in the opposing country, and even ~~when~~ within its bureaucracy) fool only the head of state.

Moreover, these particular channels tend not only to fool the head of state, but to fool him too well; to produce not merely inattentiveness and unreadiness, but (to a degree that goes beyond the requirements of the initiator) predictions, commitments, inappropriate concerns and extreme unreadiness, of a sort that ~~is~~ may be criticised by the "undeceived" public even before the event and that may appear radically damning after the event: all betokening a confidence that was not only ~~extremely~~ evidently misplaced but that was of higher degree than could be justified by any sorts of evidence known to the public.

((Another explanation, other than high confidence in certain hypotheses, would be that hypotheses covering the actual pattern of events were simply not imagined at all; but this may be contradicted by the presence of these hypotheses in public debate or in statements by the leaders themselves; or the hypotheses may be regarded as readily imaginable. This explanation is generally valid for the attack on Pearl Harbor, at the time of the attack (though some people, much earlier, had entertained this hypothesis); it is not, for the possibility of missiles on Cuba; the possibility of British-Israeli collaboration against Egypt approaches this case, though French-Israeli collaboration does not.))

In some degree, all crises commence with failures; but some ~~dangerous~~ failures are much more dangerous than others for the political positions of those who control the nation's immediate responses; and those in which a "national crisis" is closely coordinated with a personal or political crisis of the nation's ruling leaders may present special features and risks. An extreme hypothesis--with a good deal of evidence--is that these alone produce radical, surprising, fast and violent sorts of responses. (Where leaders

(where leader is reacting not only as an ~~xxxx~~ injured and threatened American, say, but as an injured and threatened office-holder; where he acts to ~~xxxx~~ defend not only his country, but his administration, his party, and himself: his political position, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ his own self-esteem and his place in history.)

A less extreme hypothesis: That such cases are more pregnant of radical and violent responses than opponent expects or realizes, more than may appear at the time, more than the leaders themselves or their publics would have predicted. (Thus, the Cuban missile crisis came closer to immediate violence, Skybolt came closer to a break in the alliance, than public ever realized. Compare other cases where alternatives more radical than those used were given greater weight than public was aware: Indochina 1954, Quemoy 1958? Korea 1953? ~~xxxxxxx~~ Suez (SAC alert?)

(In first two cases, instigator seems to have been totally unaware of the possibility of such extreme responses; likewise in Suez).

Apart from the confidence in one's own intelligence apparatus, one may deprecate the ~~xxxxxxx~~ opposing ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ bureaucracies capacity for: a) information-tightness, ~~xxxx~~ self-discipline, ability to keep opposing elements of bureaucracy under control or in the dark (one may count on leaks from conflicting elements in opponent's government); b) coordination, essential to speed and secrecy; c) speed of decision and implementation.

Thus: "they can't move fast, and they're bound to ~~be~~ leak or betray themselves as they do move...so even if they do move--which is highly unlikely--we'll know in plenty of time to forestall." The improbability of their move may be based precisely on the certainty of one's own counter, which may in turn be premised upon the slowness and lack of secrecy of their move. (One may in turn be unaware of the slowness --perhaps, predictable by an enemy more accurately than by oneself--of one's own response from a normal, unready state). To imagine a fast, secret move, producing both tactical and strategic surprise (the latter implying lack of a higher-than-normal readiness), is immediately to call into question the certainty and effectiveness of one's response, and hence the riskiness and improbability of the move.

The possibility/ease/probability of such speed and secrecy may be exaggerated by the analyst who is unaware of the difficulties of speed and coordination and of the extent of one's own apparatus for penetrating secrecy. But it may commonly be underestimated by the experienced operator. (Why? Because it goes precisely against the run of his experience, of which the layman is innocent? Like, effect of "knowing what Russians do, and what they don't do"--making expert ~~xx~~ relatively vulnerable to surprise when they change course, since he is found with strong counter-predictions and strong preconceptions against their actual move.) (Cuban missiles; lack of Russian missiles).

Analogy to analysis of Surprise Attack. ((Cuban missile case conclusively answers question: Does existence of a CIA preclude surprises like Pearl Harbor?)) ((Or: Could there have been an undetected missile gap? Distinguish this from: Was this likely, or, as likely as some "lay experts" ...

Meanwhile, the public tends not to appreciate the technical nature or the drastic effects of unreadiness, the reasons for the unlikelihood of fast or undetected moves by opponent (hence, low probability of need for constant readiness) ~~xx~~ or the extreme costs and near-impossibility of constant high readiness. All of these matters are technical, novel, complex--hence, understood by very few, even of those with "access"--and above all, secret. Moreover, both for security reasons and for political reasons, the public is deliberately misled about the actual state of readiness. (air alert;.

Thus, the effectiveness of an assault upon an unready force or government tends to be shocking, inexplicable and inexcusable, not only to the public but to most parts of the government (perhaps to all, since each ~~xxx~~ expert knows only his own component and may tend to simplify his model of other components in direction of idealizing or romanticizing it--i.e., accepting schoolbook, public notions--instead of generalizing to it his actual knowledge and ~~xxx~~ and "cynicism" relating to his own area; thus, breakdown of ~~xxxx~~ many parts in presence of surprise may astonish and shock everyone.

To this is added the exposure of actual lies about earlier state of readiness. (British ability to reinforce troops in Berlin crisis--Laurence Martin.

Moreover, ~~xxx~~ sensitivity of readiness to expectations, is not understood, foreseen, or excused by public: i.e., the degree of vulnerability to surprise, as distinct from likelihood of surprise.

The political leader, in sum, is damned retrospectively for:
a) his surprise; b) his unreadiness, whether or not surprised; c) his poor performance, whether or not ready.

Revised
The incentives to fait accompli, or rather, the preconditions that make it possible, are precisely: the possibility of surprising opposing leaders, their dependence on readiness, hence their paralysis or vulnerability in the face of surprise. But these are matters known only to governments (and with respect to oneself, perhaps known better to opposing governments than to one's own; one studies their preconceptions, their intelligence net as a whole and its gaps, their frictions, lags and weak points; partial knowledge of these matters for one's own country is not collected and analysed--rather, it is hoarded, protected or destroyed, or discarded after a "fix." None of it is released to public, though enemy may have most of it.

This ignorance of the public, hence their proneness to surprises concerning the ineffectiveness of their own governments in the face of external challenges that surprise the leaders (though perhaps not the public!) is part of the problem; it accentuates the domestic political pressures on the leader who has, or is about to fall victim to a successful fait accompli. Again, this effect may be unanticipated and undesired by the instigator; he wished merely to succeed, not to have his opponent radically punished for allowing his success. (He ~~may~~ even have thought that his deception would be helpful domestically to his opponent, ~~xx~~ if public took attitude that Ignorance was an Excuse (Suez; Cuban missiles).

Certain misunderstandings seem common among experienced decision-makers:

1. The possibility of a successful fait accompli--i.e., an act against their interests to which they will not, in fact, respond effectively--is underestimated by potential victims. This includes underestimates of: a) the opponent's ability to move swiftly, with coordination, in secrecy; b) the opponent's ability mislead him into a state of unreadiness; c) his own dependence on readiness for timely and effective response.

Thus he overestimates the probability of an effective response by himself that an opponent "must" take into account in considering action; ~~he~~ overstates the risks and costs of the operation; underestimates its effectiveness and its probability. *in eyes of opponent; truth is in-between*

2. The probability of secrecy, deception, ~~and~~ speed and ~~accuracy~~ change in policy are underestimated because--quite aside from their costs or incentives--they are ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ regarded as uncharacteristic of the opponent, out of pattern, unprecedented. Perhaps at best they should be regarded as having low probability, but even in terms of actual experience, let alone present incentives, the inertia of opponents in general and of certain opponents in particular (K) may be exaggerated and the probability of deception or erratic shifts held too low.

3. Belief that opponent is aware of one's relative sensitivities to various issues in terms of domestic politics...or, can make the same calculations of the domestic political impact of certain moves that one does (although this impact may be controversial within one's own government or party).

4. Over-reliance upon the principle of quiescence during election campaigns (Suez; Cuba; others? Successes?) (Currently?) as basis for achieving delayed response, fait accompli.

5. Unawareness of the effects of deceiving leaders but not public upon political position of leaders and their response; unawareness of effects of deceiving everybody on national response. (Pearl Harbor; Korea.)

6. More generally, wrong theories by the instigator of the effects of their actions on domestic politics of opponent; or at least, theories that differ from the calculations of the opposing leaders.

7. For combination of above reasons: overestimation of the probability of success of fait accompli by instigator (compared to underestimation by potential victim) and underestimation of the costs of failure (perhaps, joint costs). The instigator may look at characteristic speed, secrecy, violence of response in target (just as victim looks at characteristic patterns in opponent), and fail to foresee the effects of anger and political jeopardy: i.e., the response ~~xxxx~~ to the peculiar conditions created by the instigator (as compared to a crisis brought on by an unforeseeable act of nature).

Thus, there is considerable likelihood that instigator will himself

What is to be explained, and what creates greatest domestic political problems, is the frequency of major surprise, the intensity of surprise (in those who are expert, experienced, informed and responsible), and the content of surprise in frequent cases when there appears, at the time or later, an abundance of "evidence" pointing in the right direction.

The role of preconception and focus is important; but they may not operate to outweigh the known "evidence" in question without some other factors. Among other factors not known to the public are: 1) extreme and successful efforts at secrecy by opponent; 2) deception by opponent; 3) specifically, deception using private, diplomatic, or direct channels not known to public, or intelligence processes not known to public; 4) past, secret experience not known to public; 5) reasons, not known to public, for doubting the reliability of the evidence known to the public; 6) strong evidence, not known to the public, for believing an alternate hypothesis, perhaps not imagined by public or whose operational significance not sensed by public (thus, the content of the surprise--the precise hypotheses believed by the leaders and now disproved--may not be known by public and may in fact differ from actual event only in "small" but operationally significant ways: e.g., precise timing, target, accompanying or following events, speed, tactical secrecy, support from allies; the surprise may be real and the confusion and unreadiness of the leaders unmistakable, yet this may reflect surprise concerning only certain significant details, where the public infers ~~xxxx~~ that the gross outlines of the event were totally unforeseen; public may be allowed to believe this because it would be impossible to explain to it why leaders held such precise and confident expectations on matters of detail, nor why readiness was so sensitive to detail; moreover, leaders may not wish to take risks of admitting that they knew as much as they did, since (in view of above) it might damn them, it would expose them to criticism for concealing this earlier, it would raise questions about appropriateness of actions quite far removed, it would raise suspicions in future about alleged ignorance, and it would jeopardise information sources.

(In fact, leaders may easily forget earlier uncertainties, reasons for conviction and focus, reasons why certain details seemed critical--or, commenting upon actions of other parts of government, may never have known these--so that actions seem, in retrospect, as inexplicable to them in face of the available evidence as they would to public if that evidence were revealed: "How could we do that? It seemed like a good idea at the time.")

Now, fear that whole truth will not get out, and that partial truth will lead to mistakes and irresponsible conclusions. (worse than rumors, suspicions).

What exactly was audience, intended content, intended effect of Soviet lies and misleading statements before Cuban missile crisis? What was actual effect on opinion, actual effects on behavior, consequences prior to exposure and subsequent to exposure?

Certainly, public and allies were to be deceived; most of them were.

Why not flat lie? Southard: principle of minimum lie. Their actual statements were obviously effectively misleading, both in public and private (these corresponded, except for Bolshakov: what is source, exact wording on that?); hearers could not logically exclude another interpretation of this statements and might have asked direct question, but they didn't, and didn't appear to doubt. So at the very least, Russians did not correct, in private or public, evident interpretation of their statements in way that made them lies.

On the other hand, Russians could not exclude possibility that hearers did know truth and did not choose to ~~xxxx~~ reveal this by questions or comments. This is the way that JFK did act with Gromyko when he did know the truth! How could Russians tell from his behavior when he learned, or be sure he had not felt sure earlier than Oct 14 (say, on refugee reports; or earlier flights)?

But note that K never defended earlier statements as not intended to mislead, or denied JFK complaints about lies, or expressed surprise at JFK's claims of being deceived. One must conclude that Russians hoped that statements would delay recognition; but they could not have hoped to escape detection till mid-November.

Perhaps main effect was to ^{aim} avoid creating necessity for JFK to reveal his knowledge (achieved clandestinely--and by means he might hesitate to announce) prior to election/installation. If he had told, JFK would have seen that he could never act later if he delayed, and in fact, he would be at mercy of K if he concealed fact from public, since K could reveal telling him at any time; JFK would be forced to reveal and act. Whereas, with actual statements, JFK could claim excuse of ignorance, "now could I have believed he would lie to me," while K could maintain appearance, to credulous, of not having lied (though having justifiably concealed).

Meanwhile, he was giving strong basis for JFK to believe he would surely not put in missiles prior to election, and basis for believing, when he did see missiles, that K did not intend to reveal them prior to election. A mistake was to believe that JFK would believe he could knowledge secret till after election. (?)

Note that K had tried opposite route without success, in 1961; had warned JFK flatly in private over Berlin, added public commitment, tried to look committed and mobilize allied sentiments against action; JFK proceeded to act aggressively, mobilize, commit, etc. But that was not election year; would JFK have done the same in summer of 1962? (Could help him; but do politicians take that risk, if they can avoid?)

Was K's restraint over U-2s in September 1962 part of his implied bargain not to cause trouble prior to election?

Def. of Crisis

Analogy? Reliability, in complex systems. Crises as consequence of complexity, (of international system, of internal systems); limited attention of high-level decisionmakers.

Many problems or potential problems, seen at lower levels, simply do not reach attention of top level (who alone can produce system response?) (or perhaps, who alone can pass information to appropriate component, in absence of lower coordinating mechanism) until they produce the phenomena that are experienced as a "crisis."

(What unique roles as a channel of communication does the President perform? e.g., w.r.t. Executive branch vis a vis Congress, Allies, enemy?)

International crisis as a Distraction from the ^{government's} business of running itself, domestic affairs and politics; a claim for attention from the outside world. The crisis has the function of capturing the attention of the brass from their usual preoccupations. Is there another way?

Characteristic of crises--the role of the highest-level leader--i.e., a non-specialist, a man with other responsibilities, preoccupations. (This introduces the limitations of the generalist, the risks, and also the communication/coordination problems between the specialist and the superior.)

What does the role of the specialist--say in Berlin, Cuba, recon, etc--become in the crisis?

Crisis as a threat--not to the nation--but to the bureaucracy, to the stability of routines (McClelland), to organizational structure and power-structure, to individual's prestige; a break in normalcy; a demand for action, attention, analysis, by components who are normally (i.e., in the absence of crises, which may not be very often) inert: i.e., the leadership.

~~Crisis~~ Hence, defensive rather than exploitative attitude toward the disturbance.

except for the global

Crisis as Surprise. (The consequence of this is an implied failure of the anticipatory apparatus; those individuals who failed to warn, or whose predictions were incorrect, are now in potential trouble; defensive behavior can be expected)

Hyp:

The Generation of Crisis: a crisis ~~involves~~ (whatever that is) in one component of a system (e.g., the international system) tends to produce, by its resulting behavior, crises in other components (other bureaus, countries, public, etc.)

((e.g., Pearl Harbor as a Jap response to an internal Jap crisis...

Was Cuban missile crisis preceded by a Soviet crisis?))

Distinguish Crises from Conflict: imagine conflict ~~accompanied by~~ unaccompanied by crisis. What is basis of association of crisis and conflict.

Is the notion of Management really compatible with the notion of (internally perceived and felt) Crisis? Or does management suggest a routinized response, by specialist, administrator?

Characteristic: Activation, Involvement, of ~~ex~~ bureaus, individuals, segments of society not normally preoccupied with international affairs; comm links

Waging Crisis

Why are there crises? Why were not alternatives defined and considered choices made, sooner, deliberately, prior to deadline? What sets dead If crises are defined simply as urgent decision-making problems, i.e., a fast search, with an imposed deadline, through some alternatives to inaction (which includes, "current policy, executed below Presidential level), then this covers many decision-points which the government, in effect, chooses to encounter as crises.

(Rather than to take earlier action to forestall the events that finally precipitate the "crisis," i.e., the necessity to consider alternatives to inaction; or to take extraordinary measures of intelligence collection and analysis to avoid surprise on the precise timing and shape of the precipitating events (whose general nature and possible or probable occurrence is foreseen) or to increase tactical warning and lengthen the deadline for choice; or to reconsider and evaluate alternative plans for response more or less continuously, so that a minimum of reconsideration is needed to identify preferred response when occasion finally arises;)

It may be that:

ROUTINE CRISES

- a) problem is not considered important enough--at worst, it doesn't threaten the interests, or prestige of the US or the President enough--to spend resources to "take care of" or to prepare seriously for, unless and until a serious deterioration, or some events that threaten to capture the public's attention, occur: i.e., until a "crisis."
- b) gov would plan response if the timing of events and their precise shape and context could be foreseen, but since they can't, it prefers to deal with the problem "when it arises," "the way it looks at the time"; the gov accepts the risk that resources available at the time, without planning, may be inadequate, since the risk of serious loss seems low.
- c) effective forestalling, or even planning, action would require Presidential or high-level responsibility, attention, choice; and ~~EXAM~~ given the nature of alternative pressing problems, this simply be allocated to this problem prior to events that make need for choice acute and immediate (problem "can't be postponed").
- d) a "final deadline", a time beyond which choice cannot be postponed, can be seen (perhaps, precisely: for legal reasons, treaties, the length of well-known processes, voting dates...), but it is preferred not to engage high-level attention, or more, even to define and consider alternatives very precisely, until shortly before this deadline: because the importance of context and momentary pressures ~~at~~ at the time is great, context is shifting or requires maximum consideration; or simply, there is no pressing need for commitment--i.e., irrevocable choice--prior to deadline--hence, as principle of political administration, choice is postponed because it can be. Budgets, votes,

(not only choice, but choice-process, is delayed "till the last minute").

- e) In a fairly well-defined system of decision rules and "reporting by exception" certain problems are to be referred routinely to the President --not necessarily because of larger importance or urgency but because law or politics or public ~~ex~~ opinion expects his personal cognizance and "choice; many of these "exceptions" may come to him accompanied by alternative responses or a single

This class of "routine crises"--decisions which, if specified, can be expected to be experienced as crises and which no strong effort would be made to deal with in some way that would avoid crisis--include "budget crises," speech crises, reporting crises, Press Conference Crises, riots, coups and assassinations in non-European countries (until recently?), minor "police actions" by allies...

A governmental or even Presidential action, or attitude, or indication of cognizance is expected in these latter events (a press conference question can be anticipated), but the President is content to consider these problems only "when they arise," and even the lower machinery is excused from postponing consideration till then.

The warning, reporting, planning and implementing machinery could use a good deal of improving for dealing with these Routine Crises--with the important effect of reducing the chance of their getting out of control and turning into Major Crises, or of mistaking an incipient Major Crisis, in its early phases, for a Routine Crisis.

Even in some cases where the problem is important, can be foreseen, and a preferred solution can be predicted broadly, there may be a high-level choice to wait and deal with it as a crisis; to refrain from planning (considering alternatives in detail), preparing, or choosing until a precipitating event actually occurs.

1) Plans, preparations, even speculation and consideration, may lead leak to other parts of government, to public, to Congress, to allies, to UN, to opponents: warn and mobilize opposition, give it time to block preferred action. Thus, it is important to surprise opponents of policy (i.e., to give them a crisis, or a fait accompli). Plans, etc. inform outsiders, and this is not desired

2) Forestalling action, or preparations, will meet with opposition within government, allies, or public: whose mood, however, can be expected to change in the presence of certain precipitating events. Or even if it doesn't change: choice or plans now could only deal with bad alternatives, and one might as well choose among the bad alternatives available then (and hope that opposition will then permit a relatively good alternative that may be available).

3) None of the ways of handling the problem in advance of serious deterioration of events seem very effective, or seem risky, etc.; might as well wait and see what turns up.

In these cases, the government may, at the time, "go through the motions" of a crisis, though merely reconsidering predetermined alternatives with a clear preferred solution; or may have to do detailed consideration in the light of the current context, though a preferred solution is known broadly. However, the postponement of preparation and planning can lead to surprises when the foreseen event finally does occur (the President may regret having chosen earlier to "wait for the crisis."; he may find himself in a more desperate crisis than he had ~~expected~~ expected or wished, or "needed").

(President Herbert Hoover, Dec. 22, 1931) An incident may be chosen to

Contest of opportunity. Provocation of choice.

An incident may be chosen to "trigger consideration" of alternatives that would never be acceptable to Congress, public or allies, except in "desperate" circumstances (i.e., unwarned, requiring fast and if need be, radical action).

Actors may even be unaware that they are "exploiting" the incident in this way, though an observer might see clearly their "need for a crisis"--their "need to be caught unprepared (with lesser, effective remedies)" --if they are to implement a desired course of action.

FDR is accused of this at Pearl Harbor. Truman needed something to accomplish budget build-up implied in NSC-68.

This need may be felt not at Presidential level, but below; subordinates or political opponents or Congress may encourage him to make threats or commitments--which he may make only ~~xxxxxxx~~ to win their support, thinking and hoping that they will not be called--in hopes that an event--unforeseen~~xx~~ and not hedged against by President--will trigger them.

(When does a President--under what pressures, conditions--make a clear commitment? Who desires it; what ends does he seek; what are ~~expectations~~ his expectations of its effect, of chance it will be triggered, of desirability of carrying it out if it is triggered?)
(he--President)

Finally, there

Finally, there are Major Crises: of extreme importance to the country, the administration and the President, in which choice could not be made prior to the events (without a deadline) because ~~maximax~~ the context and the available alternatives (and sub-goals, mood of public, etc.) could not be adequately foreseen ~~if~~ even if events could be, and the government's response must be tailored to the evolution of a fast-moving sequence of events unpredictable in critical detail (requiring close attention and fast, shifting response).

None of this requires major surprise. Decision is postponed till the last minute simply to have the advantages of as much information, and as timely information as possible.

Why then does the association of Major Crisis with Major Surprise appear as strong as it does? Since there can be, in principle, foreseeable crises--even, foreseen major crises--why do ~~some~~ so many crises appear totally unforeseen in major aspects? Why do so many others appear horribly surprising in critical details of the challenge or in performance?

The starts of wars, for example, may be foreseen and would be major crises under any circumstances ((except, the traditional concept of the onset of World War III: SIOP '62)). Why do they so commonly come accompanied by horrible surprise?

Note that Major Surprise comes close to being a sufficient condition for Major Crisis (unless surprise quickly comes to appear totally unthreatening). The puzzle is that it doesn't seem necessary; yet the association of the two is very strong, so much so as to make it look almost defining, necessary and sufficient.

Something else to be explained is that events or failures may be much more surprising to the highest levels of government than to the public or allies (or other parts of government), though the information available to the President is presumed to be, and is in fact, more complete.

(Cuban missiles; Suez;

Another ~~ix~~ point to be explained is: extreme surprise on part of President, evident confusion, astonishment, anger, and extreme unreadiness, despite evidence that events were foreseen within the government (even if not to the public) in broad outline, perhaps even in what appears to the public to be all significant details.

(Suez; Pearl Harbor; opening attacks in WWII).

All of this contributes to the empirical fact that major crises tend to commence with failures: implying political crises for those with responsibility to foresee, prepare, warn public, deter or forestall, and respond.

Consider events following which there was a Congressional Investigation of preparation and response (Pearl Harbor; Cuban missiles; Bay of Pigs; in France, outbreak of war; in England, Suez?;

In the eyes of the public, great crises take place at High Noon. The street is deserted; the deputies on both sides are absent; the public is watching, behind shutters; the two protagonists move toward a confrontation, alone.

That is popular view. To one familiar with day-to-day workings of government--the apparatus of staffs and planning, intelligence estimates, committees and coordination--it appears childishly simplified. Yet on a close, strikingly accurate. To ~~xxxi~~ extraordinary degree, Gov Behavior in a Crisis is Presidential behavior. Crisis decision-making is decision-making by the President and a small group of high-level advisors--with very little assistance by their own staffs and agencies. The ExComm phenomenon. *Clayton Koppelman*

In ordinary affairs, easy to exaggerate role of President. But in crisis, he assumes command--directly of operating units.

Need to change policy; weigh risks, determine national objectives, consider and prepare violent action. No one qualified but the President: by authority, by information, by range and depth of responsibility. He will want his judgment to be controlling.

Thus, participating by President and immediate, cabinet-level officers in all stages of policy determination is natural; importance, speed, need for great coordination. But other aspects of Excomm phenomenon: secrecy, absence of staff. Will discuss reasons, consequences.

Why sudden interest in crises? Cuban Crisis alerted us both to risks and to opportunities. And reduced in the war that comes without crisis: the surprise attack, that arrives without warning and calls for no decision, only a preplanned response.

New feeling: if war comes, it will come out of a crisis: a period of emergency decision-making, of urgent search among immediate alternatives to inaction or current policies; of high-level consultation and soul-searching and communication, within governments, between allies, and with opponents.

Interest in : avoiding crises; preparing for them; foreseeing them, tactically; acting wisely and promptly when they occur; reducing their risks.

Answers depend on understanding of crises as phenomena: how do they arise, how is behavior determined, how do choices of different parties interlock to dampen the crisis or cause it to explode?

Clayton Koppelman Earlier speech topic: contribution of social sciences to peace and war; Gov behavior in crises. Narrows to understanding of leadership behavior.

But this is mystery; though political scientists may not recognize it, it lies at heart of several layers of ignorance; a riddle wrapped inside a mystery inside an enigma. Outer darkness: interaction of opposing bureaucracies; inner mystery: workings of our own bureaucracy; ~~xxxxxx~~ black box, complex. Heart of darkness: President. Despite publicity, one man; his decision-making is protected; true black box. One sees only few inputs, few outputs.

Hence, crisis decision-making is mysterious. Tantalizing, because group psychology and individual psychology applicable--if specifics available.

Reasons for ExComm phenomenon: secrecy and exclusion: if first reason is executive communication; second is excommunication. *Control of message; control of policy.* Crisis as Dialog. Crisis as Failure. Effects.

Implications for social science.

The Cuban crisis left us with ambivalent attitudes towards crises and the threat of violence. At once, it reminded us of the ultimate risks that are now implicit in challenges and conflicts that can explode into nuclear war, and ~~fixing~~ it demonstrated that the threat of such a conflict, with its attendant threat of explosion, could achieve important national ends. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that if the risks of such tactics were to be tolerable at all it could only be because those risks were being controlled as wisely and effectively as possible, by those with the best information and the broadest responsibility.

Ambivalence, too, toward the notion of "management"--because of denunciations of the "management of news". Control of news was

Crisis as Communication

Reasons for Not Communicating (Privacy, Secrecy, Discretion);

within gov, public, opponents, allies, opposing & allied publics

Adversary: allies, opponents, K;

ally

ally

Release them of responsibility for acting or not acting
for threatening, committing, meeting, talking.

Address to consciousness of flow, efforts, this as conflict negotiators.

What is a Communication: (Thompson vs. states themselves)

What events trigger events, high level consideration of immediate commitment
to instantiation
or action

Crisis as Failure (with sides) - Plans - into to plan, prepare

Crisis as Surprise (negotiation of on both sides - provocations)

Adversary communications: with multiple indicators, multi channel.
Crisis as Communication: How common fact, that my production of my behavior is

Crisis as Prescribed Behavior

Committing

Within then yours: that I am highly likely to
take certain limited actions, that I might
take some unlimited actions?

Crisis take place

at high noon - and the citizens
watching behind their shutters

Crisis as negotiating.

Possible patterns:

1. For preparatory opponents' actions to lead to exaggerated reports of specific, observable activity that will be disproved by photos, with the effects that: a) these reports are discredited and essentially ignored, alternative explanations not being adequately explored ("Where there's no fire, after all, there's no real smoke.") b) Later, correct reports of similar appearance are regarded as implausible.

Basis for the early exaggeration: sources may report inferences, predictions, rumors, as concrete, observed activities, in specific locations.

Events leading to crisis

1. Events that create demands or expectations in others (to whose demands, preparations or opinions the USG is sensitive) for actions or changes in policy by USG.

(If no change in policy is at stake, the actions involved may still require determination of their use, timing or precise nature by the President; i.e., the President may be part of the planned mechanism for the "management" of certain aspects of current policies.)

This may arise even though the Pres does not believe that the events in themselves create an opportunity, a challenge, or ~~xxx~~ affect the national interests as he sees them. The interpretations, desires, fears or expectations of others based on these events may, however, create a "problem" for the USG.

2. Cf expectations of others w.r.t. Hungary. What is expected of us in case of uprising in East Germany? (Ep 1-64): How much difference would it make to our feelings/response if the fight were between Comm elements, ~~xx~~ or were popular uprising? Would it merely affect our emotional involvement, but not our policy? (Cuba suggests major importance for emotional/psychological factors.)

(Note shame associated in Ep 1-64 with revealing basic fears, goals.)

((What, then, are circumstances that could raise the possibility of having to reveal, by actions or inaction, preferences or expectations that differ from our declared or believed ones? How might we be "called"?))

(Note: probable lack of plans for supporting a policy which we do not choose to admit, even to ourselves, prior to the event: e.g., for sitting on the West Germans in case of an East German revolt. Hence, unpreparedness...)

What are situations likely to encourage independent policies by one or more of our Allies? How likely are we to anticipate or prepare for such action? (Or is it in the "unthinkable" category? Suez.)

Questions and tasks

7. Analyze ~~Discussion~~ Dimensions of Surprise.

(e.g.: Was precipitating event anticipated: in planning, in intelligence estimates, by individuals at different levels, by Pres; as possibility, as past experience, as probable. - If not, various sorts of reasons why not. Were preparations made: for better short-run anticipation (alarm), for response? What sort; by whom; with what effectiveness?

8. Investigate alerting procedures: in different agencies, at different levels and components of given agency. What are plans; are they coordinated? Jointly exercised? Are they actually used; what is history of this? If not, why not? How modified in actual use? Why/when would they not be used?

What do different agencies know of each other's alerting procedures, plans? What do we know of Allies'? Of Soviet Union's? China? Russia?

What do they know of ours?

What have reactions actually been in past to alerting measures?

How have alerts actually been executed in past? How much is known of this at time to high-level commanders? How much has this been studied? How do exercise results correlate with actual practice? How do both correlate to plans?

What interagency, inter-Allied problems have arisen in alerts?

How well are various alerting procedures coordinated to warning procedures?

What messages do various alerts convey? How much noise? What do we know of enemy, Allied, public interpretation? How does lack of coordination affect this?

9. Evaluate past crises, in terms of what losses were risked, experienced, avoided; what benefits.

Examine, with retrospective data, how courses of action actually proposed but not adopted might have worked out (e.g., total blockade of Cuba;

10. Compile list of standard action proposals in crises; examine what evidence can be brought to bear upon their effectiveness: e.g., evidence as to their effect if they had been used; evidence as to their effect when actually used in past. How much has this been studied?

e.g.: blockade

boycott

declarations of various kinds (including Congressional, public)

demonstrations of various kinds

harassing, spoofing

sabotage; covert action

assassination

mobilizations

11. What do top people see as "rules of the game"? in various areas.
How do these differ from explicit, admitted rules; those known to publics?
What sorts of actions are perceived as violations of the rules? What are
emotional and behavior reactions to such breaks?

Questions:

1. Under what circumstances would X not have been a "crisis"? What would have prevented it from arising at all?

Under what circumstances does it make sense to talk of a "quiet" crisis or a "prolonged crisis?" When the possibility of military action looms for a long time? (Komer: India-Pakistan as a quiet crisis).

2. In retrospect, how might actual crises have been much worse? What could have gone wrong? What would have horribly confused things--say, given current interpretations of the situation? How could Soviets have done much better?

3. What are ways of scoring US crisis performance? What ways are actually used? i.e., what are individuals' criteria of success or failure? What are differences among these; how do differences affect behavior? What is seen at time as possible losses or benefits; what later?

4. following (2) above: Could actual crises be points of departure, starting-point scenarios, for modified scenarios of "might-have-been" crises. Take situation as it existed--and agency positions, expectations, differences of opinion, objectives, as they actually were, in full richness of detail and background--and ask the people who actually participated how situation might have been affected by certain modifications or developments,

((Analogy: the seminar phase of a two-sided wargame: talking through alternative courses) (Check with ~~W~~ Weiner, de Weerd)

5. Is it an objective to eliminate crises? Or are crises (including non-military crises) equivalent to high-level decision points? i.e., are they simply what a decision point, a choice, a commitment, looks like at high level? (No: there are many decision points that do not feel like a crisis, nor do they call for military action). Are

ARE THERE FUNCTIONS OF CRISIS? Suppose there were no experiences like crises; would some goals be harder to achieve, would some problems become harder?

Compare a fire station, a hospital emergency clinic, a police desk: the latter, particularly, ~~is~~ exists precisely to deal with the need for imminent use of force: are these calls to function experienced as crises? How much planning is there; how much reliance on SOP, checklists?

6. HOW MUCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS DONE WITHIN GOVERNMENT, RELATED TO SECURITY AND CRISES? BY AGENCIES? How much use of checklists, SOPs, distribution lists? Are there parallels to Emergency Action Files in State, CIA, White House? Are these preparations coordinated, known to each other? How do they mesh? ARE THEY USED IN CRISIS?

(Task for Bennington)

Def of Crisis: 2 Characteristics, Functions

(McClelland): Vested, conservative, interest of US and SU in maintaining their familiar leadership of their alliances. Room for collaboration here. In fact, the occurrence of crises--so long as they don't get out of control--serves this mutual interest (binding alliances, submerging disputes, winning support from Congress and public).

But given competition: to the extent that familiar areas of dispute are stalemated, urge to try new areas, tactics; this can produce unexpected, novel control problems for opponent, create a crisis--and possible loss of control. (Cuba II).

Third parties, new to the "game," may also create these unexpected problems.

The Crisis--as an unanticipated, unfamiliar, control problem--has new dangers, in nuclear world.

A major change in international system--spreading of nuclears, independence of allies, depolarization--may tend to generate Crises.

Advantage of "goal-directed" (intelligent?) behavior: can cope with situations not envisaged by designer

[Study on essential for a crisis / TN war alerting and response system

esp. given incentives for ^{evolving} ~~designing~~ a surprise-prone, unready system: must be able to recover from surprise, learn, adapt in & from crises (when many of the inhibitions to adaptive activity are reduced — to return soon after crisis)

Costs of Peacetime Planning for Crisis and Wars

(Effects of peacetime goals & pressures & perspectives on plans & preparations and on actual operations in crises)

Note: fear of lessening our ability to muddle through, to improvise to meet short-run problems, by preparations for long-run. What are potential conflicts here?
What are the "requirements for muddling through"?

Yarmolinsky: 2

What is wanted in the campaign oratory of an incumbent Administration is Wordsworth's recipe for poetry: Emotion recollected in tranquillity.

Intelligence in Crises (i.e., intelligent behavior; learning, adaptation, appropriateness, coordination)

The government has (almost) no memory. (Note resistance to, lack of, studies of operations and crises; gaps and inadequacies of existing studies). Lack of continuity of personnel; continuity of relationships; experienced people drop out of discussion as it goes higher; lack of files, retention of drafts, etc; (Laos)

What experience is likely to be applied at higher levels? The personal experience of the top people? --very short in new administration; this means that vivid experiences of a Sec or Pres are likely to have great influence in shaping new perceptions, regardless of real relevance, and to have impact on a wide range of new choices, while older national experiences are ignored, though more relevant.

Laos: Dominant time lags are involved in the process of forming and considering policy, not in the transmission of messages. When decisions must all be referred back to higher authority: 1) necessary to get the attention of higher authority; delays; 2) committees, consultation, coordination necessary, delays, time-consuming; 3) higher authority must be briefed on background, problem; 4) at the level where "broad considerations" enter, controversy is keen--on goals, facts, policies, and other problems that should be getting attention;

((Is all this true in a "recognized crisis," unlike Laos? (Of course, during crisis, all these problems are accentuated for a "quiet crisis" that may be going on elsewhere.))

Should gov adopt "activist" policy--of sort where delegation is undesired because of "threshold effects" of minor choices, chance of major problems or escalation--so that high-level people must take part in control--when it can be foreseen that situation will not compete effectively, day to day, for the attention of the top level, so that above delays are inevitable?

Perhaps adoption of activist policy could be predicated on the availability, at the time, of a person whom higher authorities are willing to entrust with delegated authority. (e.g., Ambassador; Asst Sec).

On Photos:

Patterns of impact, inference, interpretation:

- a) Negative evidence weighed (too?) strongly: Sept 5, 1962; note similarity of DIA reaction to negative evidence of removal of missiles, (and absence of positive evidence--because no flights), 29 Oct--1 Nov; Missile gap, 1958-1961 (e.g., MRBMs); *(was the right to be so confident on negative evidence of photos' grain value?)*
- b) Given early, positive evidence: tendency to assume that situation will not change drastically or quickly; Sept 5, 62; Sept, 1961 (underestimated speed of introduction of SS-7, hardening, rate of introduction);
- c) tendency (?) to "wait till the--"hard"--evidence is in"...before drawing conclusions, doing contingency planning, scheduling meetings

(despite the fact that there may be long "accidental" delays in acquiring hard evidence; by the way, are these delays themselves regarded as if they were evidence ("We still have no evidence of...latest evidence still shows..."))

How easy was it for analysts to get attention of top between 15 Sept-14 Oct? Did top attitude change between 28 Aug - 5 Sept?

Among reasons why tactic of fait accompli based on secrecy and deception is chosen, in preference to reliance on public pressures and time-consuming processes:

Anticipated opposition (either to goals or risks or methods) to latter approach among one's own bureaucracy, or public, or allies, or neutrals: quite ~~xxx~~ aside from response of opponent. At the least so long as preparations are kept secret, one can get on with it (get on with planning, preparations: keep busy, happily and hopefully) instead of being blocked at the earliest mention; and one hopes to justify these preparations, and to achieve both success and the acceptance of move by public, allies, etc.--without paying political price either for secrecy and deception or for accepting the risks and undesirable features of operation--by buying off protests with delivery of actual success (which can be attributed to--and may really be due to--"necessary" secrecy and deception). Whereas public, staff (Skybolt) may quickly stifle announced attempt to achieve such "success" (whose advantages they may not even appreciate until they actually experience them, while they exaggerate risks, costs, importance of other goals), and moreover, punish admin. for even suggesting it.

Moreover, one may suspect that in the "victim" country, the ~~xxxxxxx~~ actual top decision-makers may not mind the move at all, or might be easy to placate or compensate (Ike in Suez, British in Skybolt; view of JFK in Cuba?), but his staff, bureaucracy, public or allies might mobilize to resist move, or force him to resist move, if they knew about it (or might ~~xxx~~ punish him afterwards if they ~~knew~~ found out he had known about it and had done nothing).

Thus, one makes it easier for him to accept (or even, one does him a favor, accomplishes something he really wants--e.g., fall of Nasser, exchange of Sky for Polaris) by (a) keeping operation a secret from his public, etc; (b) not providing grounds for charge that he was told

However, if one uses to deceive his own public, by misleading him and letting him or encouraging him to mislead his public (which may be necessary, to stop his domestic pressures), one puts him in utmost political jeopardy, to no direct advantage. At best, he is going to be made to look like a failure, inattentive, unready, unimaginative; but this tactic sets him to look like an idiot, a ~~xxxxxxx~~ gullible ~~fo~~ fool, an accessory to deception, if not a liar and traitor.

((Note actual suspicions voiced that FDR knew of Pearl Harbor; Ike knew of British-French attack; JFK knew of truth of Keating claims (and note degree of actual basis for these suspicions; Pres did know more than he told public at time or admitted later; and evidence as to what he did know is ambiguous or even suggests strongly that he knew everything, though in fact he was significantly misled--for reasons that do not come out.))

((Note notions that we might "really do SU a favor by"...e.g., nitting Chicoms; or do Germans a favor by dropping attempts to unify;))

Third: ~~xxxxxxx~~ one may deceive another not because he would obstruct or because he prefers to be kept in dark (like a politician who doesn't want to know plans: Eden, Russell?) but because he might leak or inadvertently reveal, or because his ignorance or deception is instrumental to deceiving others. (To deceive US, deceive Pres. e.g., deceive public one way, but keep Pres from educating them by deceiving him and